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 1. Introduction 
The twenty-first century is commonly referred to as the “Pacific Century” in the field of 
International Relations, and in no place has the rise of Asia been more apparent than in sub-
Saharan Africa, with the abrupt entry of China in the 1990s.1 The scale and scope of Chinese 
activities pose a direct challenge to prevailing North-South dynamics on the continent, with 
implications for existent norms of Geopolitics, Development and Global Governance, among 
others.2 The turn of the century has seen Sino-African relations take on a renewed vigour 
with China naming 2006 the ‘Year of Africa’ and former President Obasanjo of Nigeria 
proclaiming to former President Hu Jintao of China that “When you’re leading the world, we 
want to be very close behind you.”3 These dynamics, mixed with criticism from the West and 
indeed certain African circles have motivated a surge in research efforts to understand and 
make predictions on Sino-Western-African relations. Much has been written on how China 
in Africa demonstrates broader trends “that put China at the centre of global politics.”4 On 
the other hand, scholars claim that China is “not likely to transform things” as far as the 
development of the continent is concerned, partly due to the ‘intractability’ of African 
governments, and partly due to the continued dependence on primary goods.5 The 
implications on Global Governance, particularly regarding the norm of Sovereignty, 
however, remain underdeveloped in the literature, and will be the focus of this paper. 
Specifically, the analysis will consider the approaches of the most contentious ‘newcomer’ in 
African affairs, China, with the champion of the ‘old school’ system, the European Union 
(EU). The following research question will be considered: How do the EU and China pursue their 
interests in sub-Saharan Africa, and what are the implications for Sovereignty?  
                                                
Cover Image Source: helenasway@yahoo.com on Flickr. (Accessed 03/05/2013): Fishing boat on Niger River. 
1 Chris Alden (2008), ‘Africa without Europeans’ in Chris Alden, Daniel Large and Ricardo Soares de Oliveira 
(eds.), China Returns to Africa: A Rising Power and a Continent Embrace, London: Hurst & Company: 358. 
2 As suggested by Frans-Paul van der Putten (2012),‘Dealing with political-economic diversity in the developing 
world’, in Van der Putten et al., ‘The Focus: Africa and the Chinese way’, IIAS Newsletter 60: 19; See also Giles 
Mohan & Marcus Power (2008), ‘New African Choices? The Politics of Chinese Engagement’, Review of African 
Political Economy, 35 (115): 38. 
3 Declaration made to President Hu Jintao and his entourage on an official visit to Nigeria, quoted in Philip 
Snow (2008), ‘Foreward’ in Chris Alden, Daniel Large and Ricardo Soares de Oliveira (eds.), China Returns to 
Africa: A Rising Power and a Continent Embrace, London: Hurst & Company: xvi.  
4 Chris Alden, Daniel Large and Ricardo Soares de Oliveira (2008), ‘Introduction’ in Chris Alden, Daniel Large 
and Ricardo Soares de Oliveira (eds.), China Returns to Africa: A Rising Power and a Continent Embrace, London: Hurst 
& Company: 19. 
5 Christopher Clapham (2008), ‘Fitting China In’ in Chris Alden, Daniel Large and Ricardo Soares de Oliveira 
(eds.), China Returns to Africa: A Rising Power and a Continent Embrace, London: Hurst & Company: 362. 
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 In order to address this question, the analysis will consider what the actors’ various 
interests are, whether and how they differ, what their respective approaches to sovereignty 
are, and how they relate to the status of the norm in international relations. I argue that 
whereas the EU finds sovereignty to be ‘subjective’ to internal legitimacy, China adopts a 
‘defensive’ stance on the norm. These positions are the result of each of the actors’ interests 
respectively, with the EU focused on spreading norms of democracy and accountability, and 
China’s defensive stance in light of internal friction over territorial disputes. The result is that 
“Sovereignty is What States Make of It”, with each actor adhering to the norm to the extent 
that it suits their interests.   
Interests: 
Based on the assumption that policies are driven by state interests, with states being egoistic, 
rational actors in the anarchic international system, this paper will consider Chinese and 
European strategies in Africa since the turn of the century and their impact on sovereignty in 
the host state.6 The dependent variable is therefore the norm of Sovereignty, as affected by 
existent Africa Strategies. These strategies are defined in the broadest sense to incorporate 
Official Development Assistance (ODA; including grants and concessional loans) and Other 
Official Loans (OOF; including export buyers’ credits and official loans at commercial rates).7 
Such a broad definition is necessary to account for both the “old” and “new” approaches to 
Africa championed by the EU and China respectively, as a consideration of Chinese ODA 
would include only a fraction of the State-lead approaches to political-economic diversity. 
Africa Strategies are accordingly determined by the Independent Variables: Interests. 
Interests in sub-Saharan Africa are generally grouped into energy security interests, economic 
interests, and diplomatic interests by scholars, according to their respective paradigms. These 
will be further discussed in the Literature Review. 
                                                
6 This assumption of state centrism is held by both Neorealists and Neoliberals. Disagreement between these 
schools of thought concern who the other actors in the international system are and whether states are unitary, 
as discussed by Ilona Steiler (2009), The European Union and China in Africa (Hamburg: Kovač): 46.  
7 As termed by Deborah Brautigam (2011b), ‘Chinese Development Aid in Africa: What, where, why, and how 
much?’ in Rising China: Global Challenges and Opportunities, Jane Golley and Ligang Song, eds, Canberra: Australia 
National University Press: 204; Brautigam’s article focuses on the dangers of considering OOF as Aid, as they 
often involve largely private activities. However, since our analysis is on State-Strategies in Africa, and not just 
Aid, the provision of incentives for private actors to invest in Africa should be considered.  
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Though most analysis thus far has focused on the three main interests separately, I 
argue that countries are increasingly focusing on Smart Power strategies as a multi-faceted 
approach to pursue these interlinked interests. With increasing competition over strategies 
and involvement in Africa, from an increasing number of developed, emergent and 
developing actors, states need to win the hearts and minds of their target audience in order to 
pursue their interests. Figure 1 provides an illustration of the current GDP per capita of the 
EU, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and sub-Saharan Africa compared to the rest of 
the world before the Global Recession in 2008. Their clear statuses as developed, emergent 
and developing states respectively are evident based on their GDP per capita. The interaction 
between such actors has great implications on the future of Global Governance in 
International Relations. This study will provide an insight on these implications by focusing 
on the norm of Sovereignty as played out in Africa, with a focus on Nigeria.  
 
FIGURE 1: World GDP based on PPP per capita (2013)8 
  
                                                
8 Figure Source: http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/ (Accessed 30/05/13) 
EU: 
$30,150 
sub-Saharan 
Africa: $2,060 
China (PRC): 
$5,548 
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Sovereignty:  
The 1648 Treaty of Westphalia established States as the primary legal actors in International 
Law, based on the principle of Sovereignty. Westphalian sovereignty rested on the 
assumption that states have a right to territorial integrity, non-intervention and political 
autonomy.9 The international community staunchly upheld these principles in the centuries 
that followed, and sovereignty is often considered to be the most important principle 
underlying Public International Law. It presupposes legal equality, placing all sovereign states 
at the same level in the International System, with an equal hold on the basic attributes of 
statehood.10 After the two World Wars, however, the need to protect humans against 
indiscriminate violence emerged as a growing norm, leading to the development of the 
concept of Human Rights. The Charter of the United Nations, drafted towards the end of the 
Second World War includes both concepts: staunchly upholding the principle of sovereignty 
while laying the grounds for fundamental rights of peoples under the principle of self-
determination.11 The 1960 Declaration of the Granting of Independence to Colonial 
Countries and Peoples enshrined the right to self-determination and Sovereignty of colonies, 
including those in sub-Saharan Africa. However, globalization and the increase of factors that 
cut across borders, such as inadequate economic relations, terrorism, the environment and 
indeed human rights, have since lead to debates over universalism and particularism in 
International Law, which are sometimes at odds with older norms. State sovereignty and 
human rights are considered as two fundamental values in international relations… [but] 
which is more important?”12 Indeed Professor McDougal presents International Law as “a 
comprehensive process of authoritative decision” dependent on the pressures and influences 
faced by decision makers. These include the “values of the community in which that person 
                                                
9 Mark Amstutz (2005), International Ethic: Concepts, Theories, and Cases in Global Politics. Lanham: Rowman and 
Littlefield Publishers: 76, 129.  
10 Malcolm Shaw (2008), International Law, 6th Ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 45. Attributes of 
statehood are listed in the 1943 Montevedeo Convention as entities with a territory (established land mass 
determined by boundaries), a population, an effective government (with control over the population), and the 
capacity to engage in International Relations with other states. 
11 United Nations Charter, Chapter I, Art. 2 (1) explicitly states that the UN “is based on the principle of the 
sovereign equality of all its Members”, while Art. 1 (2) mentions the respect for “the principle of equal rights and 
self-determination of peoples” 
12 Jing Men & Benjamin Barton 2012, ‘Introduction’ in Jing Men & Benjamin Barton (eds.), China and the 
European Union in Africa: Partners or Competitors? Surrey: Ashgate: 12-13. 
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operates, and the interests of the particular nation-state served.”13 This outlook provides a 
linkage between Sovereignty as a legal term and practical studies of power and authority in 
International Relations, and will be adopted in the analysis. Regarding China and the 
European Union in Africa, their pursuit of interests (rooted in their values) therefore has an 
influence on their respective views on Sovereignty, and the development of the norm in 
International Relations.  
The analysis will proceed as follows: Beginning with a literature review to consider 
established understandings of how China and the European Union pursue their interests in 
Africa, the question of motivations behind foreign policies will be addressed in order to better 
explain these policies. The theoretical framework will then be laid out on how these policies 
may impact sovereignty in practice, with hypotheses generated through the perspectives of 
the prevailing schools of IR. An in-depth case study of Nigeria will then be analysed to test 
whether the assumptions of theories used hold empirically, and whether the hypotheses follow 
accordingly. The direct and indirect implications on Sovereignty will then be considered, as 
an indication of how the norm is affected in cases of political-economic diversity, and the 
extent to which the contrasting approaches may change it. Broader implications of the 
findings for theory and policy will follow, with suggestions for further areas of research. 
2. Literature Review 
Literature on Chinese versus EU approaches to Africa generally convenes around three 
central activities: resource extraction, access to markets for exports and diplomatic support. 
These can be linked to energy security, economic and diplomatic interests respectively. 
Whereas scholars agree that both actors have an interest in political stability on the continent, 
they generally distinguish the Chinese model as non-interventionist, focusing on economic 
interests of growth and access to markets for exports while respecting the sovereignty of 
African states; the EU is generalised as imposing ‘conditionality clauses’ on development aid 
and pushing its normative agenda, which is seen as intrusive on sovereignty.14 The reality is 
far more complex, however, as both actors commonly pursue multiple interests, with varying 
                                                
13 Argument presented by Shaw 2008: 59-60. 
14 Sanne van der Lugt (2012), ‘Choose your own development path: providing advice without interference?’ in 
Van der Putten et al., ‘The Focus: Africa & the Chinese way’, IIAS Newsletter 60: 21 
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impacts on sovereignty, particularly as the distinction between public and private affairs is 
often blurred in African states. A clarification of these varying interests is therefore necessary 
in order to determine the major issues and implications for policy, as is a deeper consideration 
of the norm of Sovereignty.  
2.1. Energy Security Interests 
Broadly speaking, security interests are the focus of Neorealism, which considers foreign 
policies to be dependent on existing power balances in the International System. Waltz 
presents states as unitary actors interested in the accumulation of security, which enables 
them to maintain or strengthen their position in the anarchic system.15 Necessarily, all foreign 
policy is seen as serving states’ security interests, either directly or indirectly. European and 
Chinese strategies should therefore both pursue the needs of each state to maximise their 
power. Security has many elements, from internal and external military stability to more 
unconventional threats that transcend borders, such as bird flu. The former has been 
considered in great detail regarding the Responsibility to Protect and its relation to 
Sovereignty, while the latter is a newly developing field. These are both beyond the scope of 
this paper, however, as the focus is on key interests of China and the EU in Africa, whereas 
neither issue has been prioritized in the foreign policies of either actor. One element of 
security cited as the most important strategically for foreign actors in Africa is the need for 
resources or ‘Energy Security’, and will be focused on in the analysis. Energy Security theory 
follows neorealist assumptions, even though it does not strictly fall under neorealism. 
Accordingly, both the EU and China are net importers of oil and compete for a stable supply 
to ‘fuel’ their growth (pun intended), due to the zero-sum nature of resources. 
The EU focus on natural resources in Africa may be traced back to the colonial 
legacies of its member states in the region. The separate energy security agreement alongside 
the EU-Africa strategy is presented as evidence of neo-colonial tendencies, through the 
continuation of a trade imbalance whereby Africa exports primary commodities to the EU 
and imports manufactured goods or services in return.16 It is worth noting, however, that the 
                                                
15 Kenneth Waltz (2004), ‘Neorealism: Confusions and Criticisms’, Journal of Politics & Society: 2-6. 
16 European Commission (2010), Partnership for Change – The EU’s Development Cooperation with African, Caribbean and 
Pacific countries, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. 
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EU currently imports only 5% of its oil and natural gas from Africa.17 Further, though the 
energy agreement provides further support for the resources-focus, the relative lack of oil 
proliferation by the EU in states with proven reserves such as Angola and Sudan is not 
considered by a neo-colonial focus. In these states, the focus on exporting neoliberal concepts 
that would allow European companies to compete in the markets are prioritised over the 
accumulation of resources.  
China experts argue that the focus on accumulating energy resources became a key 
driver of China’s Foreign Policy in the 1990s, in response to its new status as a net importer 
and desire to counter the Hegemonic influence of the US.18 This was further catalysed by 
Premier Hu Jintao’s Energy Diplomacy Strategy, and promotion of the “Go Out Policy” in 
2002.19 China procured 28% of its oil and natural gas from Africa by 2006, primarily from 
Sudan and Angola.20 The motives for China’s involvement in Africa are seen by energy 
security scholars as predominantly to do with resources. For example, Holslag claims that 
Chinese interests in Africa are Mercantilist in nature, focusing on self-benefit with “defensive 
security calculations.”21 Holslag’s analysis is based on concepts of “Hard Power”, or clear 
intervention in other states’ affairs, and he finds that China undertook considerable efforts to 
‘adjust’ and not interfere politically in five cases of military coups in Africa, in spite of on-
going Chinese economic activity.  He concludes that the general 
Chinese approach is that problems are structural, and the only 
rational response is to adapt to political contexts rather than try 
to shape them, in order to maximise their own gains.22 China is 
therefore presented by Holslag through a defensive realist 
perspective, one that does not infringe on another state’s 
sovereignty. A pure energy security focus cannot explain the 
extent of China’s activities, however; whereas investment in 
                                                
17 Steiler 2009: 71. 
18 Mohan & Power 2008: 23-42. 
19 Ricardo Soares de Oliveira (2008), ‘Making Sense of Chinese Oil Investment in Africa’ in Chris Alden, Daniel 
Large and Ricardo Soares de Oliveira (eds.), China Returns to Africa: A Rising Power and a Continent Embrace, London: 
Hurst & Company: 88. 
20 Alden & Davies 2006: 88. Image Source: http://thefederalist-gary.blogspot.nl/2012/08/750000-chinese-
have-colonized-africa.html (Accessed 01/04/2013): Comic depicting China’s large appetite for oil that is being 
fulfilled in Africa. 
21 Jonathan Holslag (2011), ‘China and the Coups: Coping with Political Instability in Africa’, African Affairs, 
Oxford University Press 2011. 110 (440): 368. 
22 Holslag 2011: 382. 
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infrastructure may support the procurement of oil by creating transportation routes, the 
building of hospitals and schools is unnecessary from a mercantilist approach. Further 
interests need to be considered to gain a deeper understanding of state interests in Africa.  
2.2. Economic Interests  
Scholars focusing on the domestic level of analysis generally consider internal determinants of 
policy, which include economic interests, particularly the access to resources and markets for 
exports. Such interests are the focus of Neoliberal Institutionalists, who allow for variation in 
state policies based on economics, regime-type and internal preferences.23 Internal 
preferences in Europe, for example, are advancing economic growth of the Eurozone, which 
require a stable source of resources such as oil and gas, as well as access to growth markets in 
order to export products and avoid a trade deficit. European policies promote the adoption of 
the neoliberal ideology, promoting market liberalization, privatization and democracy, which 
would greatly benefit European economies if adopted internationally: Free markets allow for 
‘equal’ competition by international actors, a system that benefits European and Western 
Multinationals abroad, as they do not receive state subsidies. In the 1980s and 1990s, such 
policies were promoted through Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) that were conducted 
by the World Bank and IMF. The institutions provided financial aid to developing countries 
along with these programs with the idea that liberalizing the economy would spur 
development. SAPs focused on austerity through limiting public expenses and employment, 
increasing taxes, restraining wages, encouraging privatization and abolishing subsidies to 
strategic sectors in order to strengthen the economy.24 Within a short time span, countries 
that adopted such policies experienced decreased real incomes, increased poverty and 
reduced social conditions, leading to much criticism of SAPs and the conclusion that they 
were ineffective. They were subsequently abolished, though the EU explains their failure as a 
result of the poor implementation due to the lack of governance and accountability, and not 
due to the ideology itself.25   
                                                
23 Andrew Moravcsik (1997), ‘Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Relations,’ 
International Organization, 51 (4): 513-554.  
24 Adams 1990: 423. 
25 Taylor 2012: 128. 
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More recently, the neoliberal ideology has been promoted by the EU through “tied-
aid” agreements (such as Economic Partnership Agreements) with “conditionality” clauses. 
These conditionality clauses require the adoption of good governance policies for the receipt 
of aid. One recurrent exception to the liberal market argument advanced by the EU is the 
agricultural sector, which is staunchly protected in spite of criticisms that it stunts 
development worldwide by blocking the sector of imports that developing nations have a 
comparative advantage in.26 The domestic influence of the agricultural sector on European 
interests is therefore strong. Cohn’s comment about how African, Caribbean and Pacific 
(ACP) state benefits from EC trade agreements “declined as MFN tariffs were reduced in the 
GATT negotiations… and the nonreciprocal preferences enabled ACP states to maintain 
inefficient production structures” provides further evidence that the PTAs were designed with 
the purpose of promoting EU interests.27 The EU can also uses its political and economic 
leverage to achieve its aims, including the use of sanctions against Sudan and Zimbabwe. 
Chinese domestic interests are commonly described through the interests of the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which include domestic economic growth and job creation 
through the accumulation of resources and access to markets.28 The pursuit for a more active 
foreign policy to protect domestic interests was particularly spurred by the Asian financial 
crisis of 1997, as the CCP became more aware of the need to diversify its international 
assets.29 Policies promoting investment in resources, infrastructure and human capital in 
Africa by Chinese firms through the $5 billion China-Africa Development Fund have a 
distinctive “win-win” element to them: they boost the Chinese economy as well through the 
use of Chinese goods and labour.30 Consequently, over 100 Chinese state-owned firms that 
would not have been able to compete with their Western counterparts in an open market 
were active in Africa by 2007 as they gained from government influence and financial support 
in closed markets.31 For example, Alden and Davies present the case of Block 18 in Angola, 
which was leased to a Chinese oil company after the Chinese government provided a $2 
                                                
26 Theodore Cohn (2011), ‘International Development’ in Global Political Economy, 6th Edition (International 
Edition): Pearson: Chapter 10: 330-332. 
27 Theodore Cohn (2011), ‘Regionalism and the Global Trade Regime’ in Global Political Economy, 6th Edition 
(International Edition): Pearson: Chapter 8: 220-1. 
28 Barry Sautman and Yan Hairong (2007), ‘Friends and Interests: China’s Distinctive Links with Africa’, African 
Studies Review, 50(3): 86. 
29 Denis Tull (2006), ‘China’s engagement in Africa: scope, significance and consequences’, Journal of Modern 
African Studies, 44 (3): 460. 
30 Van der Lugt 2012: 21; Steiler 2009: 79, 93.  
31 Alden and Davies 2006: 88. 
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billion loan to the Angolan government, freeing it from its reliance on IMF funding.32 This 
case was significant in that an Indian oil company had previously secured a deal with Shell to 
assume the lease for Block 18, and the decision to give the rights to a Chinese company was 
made at the last minute, following the aid agreement. Private companies also benefitted from 
this influence, capitalising on the demand for cheap export goods such as textiles and 
electronics. 
Interestingly, active promotion of emigration to Africa has been seen in Fujian and 
Zhejiang provinces “as a source of remittances and of new jobs.”33 Indeed the difficulty of 
considering China as a unitary actor cannot be overlooked, as the CCP does not have direct 
control over the hundreds of private actors in Africa.34 Nevertheless, Beijing has been 
encouraging even autonomous Chinese actors to introduce CSR activities (Corporate Social 
Responsibility) and abide by local regulations, indicating that the government is highly 
invested in preserving their established economic interests on the continent.35 Moreover, in 
contrast to other emerging powers on the continent such as India and Brazil, the Chinese 
presence was very much state-driven at the onset, through the government’s strategy of 
“linking state diplomacy with commercial interests.”36 As a result, China is now the most 
involved of the BRICs on the continent, and even surpassed the EU and the US as the largest 
trading partner with Africa in 2008, with a value of over US$70 billion.37  
Economic interests of access to markets are widely researched and often highlighted as 
the most important. However, little is said about how this relates to sovereignty. Further, 
there is considerable evidence of the EU and China promoting their image and influence 
beyond the economic realm. Recent research has emerged on efforts of public diplomacy, 
along with increasingly polarized rhetoric on norms and values regarding Sovereignty and 
Governance from China and the EU respectively. A purely economic focus cannot explain 
                                                
32 Chris Alden and Martyn Davies (2006), ‘A Profile of the Operations of Chinese Multinationals in Africa’, 
South African Journal of International Affairs, 13 (1): 83-96.  
33 Chris Alden in Mohan and Power 2008: 33.  
34 Łukasz Fijałkowski (2011), ‘China’s ‘soft power’ in Africa?’ Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 29 (2): 227. 
35 Chris Alden (2010), ‘Resurgent continent? Africa and the world: emerging powers and Africa’, in Nicholas 
Kitchen (ed.), IDEAS reports –strategic updates, London School of Economics and Political Science. Retrieved from: 
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/43657/ (27/03/13) 
36 Alden 2010: 17. 
37 Jean-Raphaël Chaponnière (2009), ‘Chinese aid to Africa, origins, forms and issues’ in Meine Pieter van Dijk 
(ed.), The New Presence of China in Africa, Amsterdam University Press: 55. 
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investments in education and health, necessarily. In order to achieve a deeper understanding 
of the foreign policies of states in Africa, then, further interests need to be considered.38 
2.3. Diplomatic Interests  
Diplomatic Interests include the need for support in the international community, and is of 
particular interest to Public Diplomacy theorists. The core assumption is that states need 
support of the international community to legitimate action, and has an interest in 
Diplomatic Support. Accordingly, interests may be promoted through the use of Hard Power, 
as with energy security and economic interests, or “Soft Power”, a term coined by Nye in his 
seminal work in 2002. The term is a favourite among European and Chinese experts, and 
particularly relevant to Africa strategies, as Public Diplomacy may be promoted through Soft 
Power. Bull lists five components of Public Diplomacy: Listening (determining attitudes of one 
state regarding the home state), International Broadcasting (promotion of values), Advocacy 
(propaganda), Cultural Diplomacy (cultural promotion) and Cultural (student) exchanges.39  
The need for Diplomatic Support is clear in the context of multilateral forums. 
Mohan and Power note that China’s ascension to the WTO lead to a recognition that “it 
needs to court votes to protect and promote its interests.”40 The 54 African states (48 of which 
are in sub-Saharan Africa)41 represent one third of the countries in the world, which holds 
much clout in multilateral institutions with ‘one-country, one-vote’ systems such as the 
General Assembly of the UN. Support or alliances from these countries is therefore beneficial 
for China and the EU, particularly considering Africa’s status as the “largest single regional 
grouping of states and its tendency towards ‘bloc voting’ in multilateral settings such as the 
United Nations.”42  
EU-specialists commonly cite the region’s strengths as a “norm-entrepreneur”, 
demonstrated by the EU-Africa Strategy. Specifically, the EU champions the Liberal 
Democracy Model, claiming that trade liberalization and the integration of states into the 
                                                
38 Deborah Brautigam (2011a), The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa, (Oxford University Press): 277. 
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41 IMF 2013 
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global economy will lead to development. 43 The promotion of such strategies are enshrined in 
the Treaty of the European Union, and further reiterated in the Lomé and Cotonou 
principles under the EU’s external cooperation policy.44 Following great criticism after the 
ineffectiveness of the SAPs of the 1980s and 1990s, the EU started to reform policies slightly 
to allow for a more collaborative approach, suggesting the new need for diplomatic support 
from recipient states. Indeed the EU-Africa Strategy encourages more ownership in 
development policies through dialogue between the donor and recipient, economic 
partnership agreements on key sectors and good governance. Stahl refers to the use of 
incentives and sanctions through political conditionality to promote EU norms as ‘soft 
governance’.45 The EU staunchly supports these norms of global governance, arguing, 
“human rights, democracy and the rule of law are essential elements for [development, and 
therefore must be adhered to in order to receive] EU aid and political agreements.”46 Ian 
Taylor explains this prioritisation of governance over sovereignty as “related to both the 
dominance of technocratic neo/liberal thinking and a refusal to acknowledge that European 
policies have not worked in Africa to promote development.”47 Global Governance is 
therefore championed as an essential precondition to development, the absence of which is 
responsible for the failure of previous efforts. The direct implication of a Global Governance 
approach to Sovereignty is that it becomes a responsibility as opposed to a certainty, whereby a 
state has the responsibility to fulfil its obligations towards its own people and avoid harming 
its neighbours.48 If a state is unable or unwilling to do so, the responsibility falls on the 
international community to assist their fellow sovereigns, thereby prioritizing governance over 
sovereignty. Much of the literature focuses on direct breeches of traditional sovereignty that 
occur during international interventions, albeit to protect civilians in armed conflict, however 
this license to speculate on another state’s sovereignty provides much room for more indirect 
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breeches, as demonstrated through Structural Adjustment Programs of the 1980s and 1990s, 
and conditionality clauses set by the EU today.49  
The main criticism from China regarding ‘good governance’ or ‘conditionality’ 
clauses is that developing countries cannot afford to consider such ‘first world’ concerns.50 
Indeed they go further to describe multiparty politics as a ‘disaster’ in some African states, 
fuelling social turmoil and instability.51 As He Wenping claims, “common sense about human 
rights and sovereignty is only one of the common values shared by China and Africa”, 
suggesting that China is also highlighting similarities between itself and Africa, in contrast 
with the West, in order to wield soft power.52 This ‘common sense approach’ to human rights 
and sovereignty refers to a focus on collective human rights as opposed to individual rights, 
claiming “it is up to each sovereign state to establish its own conception of the rights of its 
people - what they are in any given context and how they should be realized – without 
interference from outside forces”, thereby setting sovereignty as a basis of human rights, 
including the right to development.53  
Beijing’s efforts to emphasise historical and developmental similarities between itself 
and African states date back to the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference at Bandung in 1955, 
during which a common outlook on international norms of sovereignty and intervention was 
established by the two regions. Alden explains how these efforts have ‘paid-off’: 
“With an outlook that, despite the recent emphasis on ‘good governance’ 
emanating out of the West and some African circles, is solidly statist in 
orientation, African governments have proved to be a reliable source of 
support whenever Chinese conduct has been criticized. For instance, African 
votes have been crucial for China in areas as different as the International 
Olympic Committee decision o award the 2008 Olympics to Beijing and 
blocking resolutions tabled at the UN Commission on Human Rights which 
condemn Chinese human rights abuses.”  
 - Alden, 2007 
China-experts often refer to the ‘Beijing Consensus’, a term coined by Ramo in his 
2004 publication to describe China’s approach to promoting economic development. The 
Beijing Consensus is often compared to the Washington Consensus, or approach to 
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development, with particular attention given to the contrasting norms represented by each.54 
Interestingly, the official stance of the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is 
that there is no single, unitary development model, as such a strategy would be an imposition 
on another state’s sovereignty.55 Nevertheless, the consistency with which Chinese foreign 
policy is administered allows for its conception as a consensus or model. The Beijing 
consensus cites a “no-strings-attached” approach to economic and political diversity, claiming 
respect for the right of states to choose their own path to development. Experts often link this 
philosophy to the “tributary state system” under which China perceived itself as the cultural 
centre of the world, “inspiring” (non-Chinese) ‘barbarians’ to “seek the benefits of Chinese 
culture” through the means of Soft Power, and ensuring protection against foreign attackers, 
but by no means interfering in their day-to-day activities: “China was disinterested in what 
went on abroad unless this threatened China’s borders and its internal stability.”56 This 
foreign policy system was followed for approximately two millennia in East Asia, and is seen 
as strong evidence of China’s reluctance to export its 
own ideology or even assume political control, with the 
exception of the short-lived Cultural Revolution in the 
1960s. Indeed Snow makes an interesting claim about 
how the non-interference policy was (re)adopted 
following the failure of Maoist attempts to subvert 
Western-leaning African governments in the 1960s, and 
therefore exemplified Beijing’s ability to adjust their policies as part of a learning process on 
the continent.57   
A second major factor is the “win-win” element of foreign policy initiatives (including 
development aid), whereby any agreements should accrue benefits to all parties involved.58 
The use of tied aid is therefore meant to benefit the Chinese economy (the donors) as well as 
the receiver economy, for example through the construction of a road by a Chinese 
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Multinational Corporation, which develops infrastructure to allow for further economic gain 
through the easy movement of goods, while benefitting the developer through financial 
support and international experience. The White Paper goes to great ends to distance the 
‘Chinese’ model from Western concepts of development associated with neo-colonialism 
through the “imposition of liberal democratic models”.59 The aim of this differentiation is 
undoubtedly to present China as a “better choice for Africa.”60 I argue that this focus on 
differentiating values is used to increase China’s soft power and delegitimize the EU’s soft 
power, assuming that soft power is perceived as a zero-sum game by the actors. The EU in 
turn retaliates by accusing China of greed at the expense of the respect of basic human rights 
and sustainable development.61 The criticism is not entirely unwarranted, as scholars tend to 
agree that Chinese strategies tend to prioritise elite interests, thereby widening inequality and 
generating risks of social tension as demonstrated in protests in Zambia, for example.62 Tull 
rightly states that neither state is guilt-free, however, and suggests that ‘Westerners’ are 
inclined to demarcate themselves from “China and its ‘value-free’ politics” because criticising 
China provides the West “with some respite from reflecting their own deficient policies 
towards Africa.”63  
Finally, China’s single yet highly controversial exception to the non-intervention 
principle is the requirement of support for the ‘One China Policy’, in reference to the 
diplomatic battle for representation between Beijing and Taipei. Only five African states 
currently recognise the Taipei government, with the oil-endowed and strategically important 
government of Chad having recently changed sides by recognising Beijing in 2006. This 
points to the effectiveness of Beijing’s strategies, yet an exception to the respect for 
Sovereignty cannot be taken lightly. Indeed it suggests that Sovereignty is used for rhetorical 
purposes, when suitable, thus supporting the claim that it is a front for the CCP to avoid 
external interference in their own State. An alternative view is that the CCP perceives 
sovereignty based on their own situation, as “the perception within China by the leadership 
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that the country is unstable also leads to Beijing’s prioritization of social stability.”64 Though 
authors such as Holslag claim that it is ‘naïve’ to think that domestic politics can be managed 
by foreign policies, and that China exhibits a purely economic focus, Edney argues that 
foreign policy may also be used to strengthen resources and unity domestically.65 
Difficulties in considering soft power tools should also be acknowledged, particularly 
with regards to determining causality, as it is not sure whether soft power policies are 
effective. Moreover, results of strategies take a long time to be apparent, and are particularly 
subjective in that they depend on the views of the recipient.66 Nevertheless, diplomatic 
interests allow for a different perspective than resource-focused or economic interests, and 
particularly offer a lens through which to better understand contrasting approaches to 
sovereignty. 
2.4. The Norm of Sovereignty 
The discussion of international norms necessarily requires a Constructivist perspective, which 
views norms as socially constructed results of strategic bargaining in the international system. 
Norms are defined as a standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity, 
limiting the range of choices available and constraining actions.67 As rational actors, states 
pursue their interests within their understanding of preeminent norms of IR, which brings us 
to the adage that ‘Sovereignty is What States Make of It’, to adapt Wendt’s phrase.68 David 
Lake plainly explains “the state is central to the study of international relations and will 
remain so in the foreseeable future.”69 Since statehood is inherently linked to the principle of 
sovereignty, with the modern-state being born with the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, all state-
centric theories of International Relations accordingly include assumptions about sovereignty. 
The concept of sovereignty as a variable norm was addressed by Krasner in the late 1990s, 
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who found that its meaning and practice has been altered through International Relations 
over time.70  
Though the traditional approach to sovereignty focuses on its external element, that 
being the recognition of a state as such by the international community, the ‘internal’ element 
of sovereignty brings to the fore a more complex range of actors. ‘Westphalian’ or traditional 
sovereignty assumes a monopoly on violence, and hierarchical power structure whereby the 
state holds indivisible hold over authority internally. Consequently, “citizens are bound by the 
policies enacted by their governments”, regardless of the regime type, which is why the state is 
the primary actor in International Relations.71 More contemporary approaches may accept 
this primacy and equal hold over sovereignty of all states, however they point to the need for 
a consideration of ‘internal sovereignty’ as well, which brings in the question of the degree 
and legitimacy of that hold.  Liberal Democracies have a low degree of authority over their 
citizens, being constantly contested internally and restricted in their ability to regulate 
domestic policy. More authoritarian regimes may be just as autonomous in the international 
community, however they tend to hold more authority over their own societies. Developing 
states may therefore still be in the process of negotiating the level of public authority and 
private freedom between the state and society. The increasing role of transnational actors 
may pose a direct challenge to internal sovereignty by acting autonomously and 
internationally, and therefore not supporting National Interests.72 Of particular interest is the 
role of a foreign transnational whose home state has a degree of control over its actions. A 
Chinese State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) would therefore be able to affect both the internal 
and external sovereignty of a state, particularly if poor labour standards provoke protests, as 
was the case in Kenya, Zambia and Namibia recently.  
Scholars broadly label the Chinese view on Sovereignty as ‘traditional’, and the 
European view as ‘subjective’. Clapham, for example, makes an interesting point about how 
Sovereignty is staunchly upheld by the Chinese, at least in rhetoric, yet was originally 
developed and later eroded by Western European states to meet their needs at the time. 
These competing views are most apparent in sub-Saharan Africa, in cases where “the state’s 
actual level of control over its own territory and population is progressively eroded”, thereby 
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resulting in weaker internal sovereignty and bringing the right to and respect for Sovereignty 
into question.73 As Sørensen explains:  
“Sovereignty is built on the assumption that states who have it can basically 
take care of themselves. Weak states fail to meet that condition: that is the 
core problem leading to instability in the international order.”74  
Sørensen’s view engenders the argument on how the West views sovereignty in Africa as 
‘subjective’. The general consensus in the literature is that the West does not consider 
developing states to hold all claims to sovereignty, even though some criticise this as 
continued racial profiling from the colonial era through the perception of Africa as a ‘dark’ or 
‘helpless continent’. Moreover, the West believes that funding developing states is dangerous 
as ODA promotes rentierism, stunting development and fuelling corruption; Indeed 11% of 
all ODA inadvertently leads to military spending, with the proliferation of arms, big or small, 
posing a security threat.75 Consequently, governance is given higher priority than the respect 
for sovereignty, as the lack of the former would result in a threat to international peace and 
security through the funding of military activities in an unstable environment. From this 
perspective, it is therefore understandable that Africa may be the region where sovereignty 
has been eroded the most, particularly through the “imposition of economic and political 
conditionalities” by the West in the 1980s and 1990s.76 Even with positive motives, 
sovereignty has been side-lined in light of growing international interdependence and rising 
norms of collective security and the need for contemporary responses to globalization.  
Much of the literature on Sovereignty focuses on cases of intervention in a civil war, 
whereby the legitimacy of intervention in a ‘failed state’ is brought to question.77 Direct 
breeches of Sovereignty are sometimes legitimated by the International Community through 
the Security Council, particularly in cases where a nation state is ‘unable or unwilling’ to 
protect its own civilians and requires help to do so. Indeed the contrasting approaches to 
human rights by China and the West leads to widespread debate on intervention itself on the 
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bases of human rights, the West’s ‘subjective’ sovereignty indicates a normative shift “in 
favour of bypassing sovereignty when international peace and security are threatened, human 
rights are violated, and humanitarian disasters are created by ethnic conflict.”78 
The official stance of Chinese policy makers embodied that of a ‘Status Quo’ power, 
in keeping with the generally modest regional role established for themselves in world politics 
following the end of the Cold War and the granting of the Chinese seat in the UN to the 
PRC.79 Accordingly, norms of national sovereignty and non-interference were staunchly 
supported with a ‘neo-Westphalian’ focus on external sovereignty. This was described as 
‘Defensive Sovereignty’, with a focus on protesting Western dominance in the international 
system, decolonization, the assertion of juridical sovereignty and demand for economic 
concessions and aid from the West.80 Neo-Westphalian Sovereignty views human rights as the 
responsibility of states, their transnational organizations and institutions. The 1990s saw a 
growing debate on the relevance of this view of sovereignty in the international system, 
through which China’s foreign policy demonstrated a “strict adherence to the principle of the 
inviolability of sovereignty” as the cornerstone of International Law and Relations.81 Chinese 
policy makers feared the repercussions of conditions that bypass sovereignty, as the norm is 
the sole method of maintaining peace in the International System of Anarchy. It should be 
noted that this stance was adopted when the US and its allies gained victory over Saddam 
Hussein’s Iraq in 1991, demonstrating a ‘Unipolar moment’ in the international system.82  
Authors are more divided on the current Chinese stance on sovereignty, mainly due to 
the ongoing debate among elites within the PRC on the status of the norm, the potential to 
influence this status, and the ideal situation for China. Several authors note the likelihood of a 
shift in China’s traditionalist view on sovereignty, particularly following the eventual support 
for Humanitarian Intervention in Darfur, Sudan, after years of international pressure and the 
realisation that ‘non-intervention’ effectively amounted to intervention in the context of 
supporting a leader that had lost their legitimacy.83 Moreover, there is a general consensus in 
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the literature that China’s growing presence in Africa is likely to result in growing “pressure to 
become more involved in African domestic affairs.”84 More radical arguments stem from 
Kim’s suggestion that the current stance on national sovereignty and equality is 
“meaningless” to the Chinese, who aim for a return to the hierarchical tributary system of the 
Middle Ages.85 Carlson explores contemporary thought by Chinese scholars on the 
desirability of viewing the world through the principle of ‘tianxia’ as opposed to sovereignty, 
in which unequal but benign relationships would bring stability to the International System.86  
Chinese foreign policy has not demonstrated any signs of the desire for radical change 
in the international system, however. Amitav Acharya, the UNESCO Chair in Transnational 
Challenges and Governance retorts that Chinese literature is demonstrative of an attempt to 
“legitimise the rise of China as a fundamentally positive force in International Relations”, 
prioritizing multi-polarity and harmony.87 The increasing interdependence of states in the 
international system and resultant shift in “specific manifestations of sovereignty’s role in 
International Relations” is not contested by the rising power, however the Chinese “continue 
to feel uneasy about the potential abuse of such a situation, by powers perceived to be hostile 
to weaker states in general, and China in particular.”88 The debate held is usually about who 
holds the right to doubt another state’s sovereignty. As a result, “Defensive Sovereignty” 
appears to continue in China’s foreign policy through the promotion of the norm in external 
forums to meet internal security needs. These needs are particularly present in China, with 
the on-going territorial disputes in the South and East China Seas and renewed need for 
support of the One-China Principle. 
The focus on the literature on cases of conflict, however, is not representative of the 
entire African continent, and certainly do not encompass all of the contexts in which Europe 
and China are involved. The implications of policies regarding political-economic diversity on 
Sovereignty is therefore underdeveloped, yet highly relevant to the short, medium and long 
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term concept of statehood in Africa. Moreover, China and the EU’s actions set a precedent 
for other actors on the continent, as the prevailing approach to Sovereignty that will 
determine the extent of external activity permissible on the continent. These approaches have 
implications beyond the African continent, however, as they pertain to international norms 
with global impact. 
2.5. Alternatives 
Possible alternative interests in Africa may include pure compassion, as hinted at by the 
wishes of the European Council. Such arguments may adhere to norms of development as 
charity, or moral obligation.89 Causal linkages would be hard to prove in these cases, 
however, and the overwhelming evidence for energy security, economic and diplomatic 
interests from the colonial period to the present make it empirically difficult to assume.   
 An alternative neo-functionalist argument focusing on development strategies may 
link them to the organizational spill-over tendencies of international institutions such as the 
EU or indeed the Western-created Bretton Woods Institutions, the IMF and the World Bank, 
that promote Western values.90 From this perspective, the Forum on China-Africa 
Cooperation (FOCAC, with its first meeting in 2000) would be responsible for determining 
agreements between members and subsequent implications for sovereignty. However, the 
state-centric nature of these institutions, and the prominence of bilateral agreements in 
Chinese policies in spite of them make this unlikely. 
Historical Materialists commonly pose an argument similar to neo-colonialists, criticising 
external actors in Africa for continuing decades of Western dominance that subordinates the 
‘periphery’ states.91 This subordination is seen through the continued reliance on primary 
exports and subsequent trade imbalance, whereby most African states need to import 
manufactured products from the EU and China, and can only export price volatile primary 
goods.92 Though a valid concern, many see tangible progress being made, albeit through the 
increase in commodity prices in recent years due to higher demand. Negative as it may seem, 
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some authors ask what other products could be exported, as from a Ricardian perspective raw 
materials are the factors that most African states are endowed with.93 The danger of historical 
materialism is the lack of agency given to periphery states, whereby they may be able to play 
different actors against each other in order to meet their own needs. Moreover, the focus on 
Western Dominance appears to be waning, with more literature concerned with the danger 
of ‘Eastern’ or ‘Southern’ dominance on the continent.  
A further explanation for the different approaches of the EU and China in Africa may 
concern Geography, as Europe is physically closer to the continent and is therefore more 
vulnerable to security threats. Geographical theories are becoming less viable in the 
increasingly globalized world system. Moreover, the logic of geographical proximity would 
suggest that China would be more proactive with regards to security threats in South-East 
Asia. Yet China’s focus on non-interference in the region dates back to the Tributary System, 
and China has not been involved in conflicts in Timor and Burma outside of the auspices of 
the United Nations. Theories of energy security, economic and diplomatic interests are 
therefore the most plausible, and will be examined in order to determine the extent to which 
they determine Africa strategies. 
3. Theoretical Framework  
The literature review has developed insight on the interests pursued by states and the 
strategies used to attain them. Nye's concept of ‘Smart Power’ offers a means to link Hard 
and Soft power together strategically, which is a good theoretical way to consider how 
interests are pursued by states through policy.94 The theory cautions that Smart power alone 
does not ensure results, as it depends on the context and purpose intended, an important 
element. Though suggesting that Soft Power is needed to accrue Hard Power, Nye does not, 
however, allow for the linkage of interests behind these strategies. Indeed in the African 
context resource extraction may be linked with economic deals with states, which in turn lead 
to diplomatic favour. For the EU and China, resource extraction as an interest is part and 
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“getting others to want the outcomes you want”. 
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parcel of a need for sustained economic growth, which also requires good diplomatic standing 
to support their respective regimes. The ways in which these inter-linkages are made in the 
context of Euro-Sino-African relations will be examined through a consideration of these 
‘Smart’ policies, which give light to the underlying interests behind them. Figure 2 offers an 
illustration of the theoretical framework, as derived from the literature and explanations of 
how the EU and China pursue their interests in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
IR Theory Assumptions Interest in 
Africa 
Africa Policies 
                   EU                                China 
Neo-Realism -­‐ Hard Power -­‐ Security 
maximisation -­‐ Zero-sum 
game 
Energy 
Security 
-­‐ Investment in extractive industries -­‐ Focus on ownership and stable access to 
resources 
Neo-Liberal 
Institutional-
ism 
-­‐ Hard Power -­‐ Domestic 
Growth -­‐ Absolute-gains 
focus 
Access to 
Markets for 
Economic 
Growth 
-­‐ Institutionalized aid -­‐ Preferential trade 
agreements -­‐ Encouraging Market 
liberalization and 
privatization -­‐ Domestic Growth -­‐ Sanctions against 
rogue states 
-­‐ Tied-aid -­‐ Domestic growth -­‐ Investment in 
infrastructure -­‐ Emigration promotion 
Diplomatic 
Interests 
-­‐ Soft Power 
matters -­‐ Championing 
norms of 
Global 
Governance as 
a zero-sum 
Game 
Diplomatic 
Support 
-­‐ Uphold norms of 
human rights, 
democracy and 
accountability -­‐ Gain support in 
multilateral forums -­‐ Encourage 
regionalisation 
-­‐ Uphold norms of non-
intervention and 
sovereignty -­‐ Promote the One-
China Principle -­‐ Balance against the 
West and Japan 
FIGURE 2: Theoretical Framework: Interests 
A consideration of the linkages between these interests and policies will address an 
integral part of the research question. Focusing on Aid policies, it is clear from the literature 
review that they engender energy security, economic and diplomatic interests, and that states 
strategically use their foreign policies (including official aid) as currencies to meet these 
interests simultaneously. Few inquiries have been made into the adoption of ‘Smart 
Strategies’ by states, and Development strategies offer a great insight into these. Considering 
the independent variables as interrelated instead of compartmentalizing them into Silos, as 
the competing paradigms of International Relations (IR) threaten to do, allows for a deeper 
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understanding of the interests of states in IR. Consequently, ‘Smart Power’ allows for the sort 
of analytical eclecticism that is needed in the field.95  
Further, the pursuit interests presented in the literature review are all likely to influence 
sovereignty to some extent, and the theoretical framework allows for a consideration of each 
in turn. This will be carried out through an in-depth case study of the EU and China in 
Nigeria, their pursuit of interests and the impact of each on sovereignty. The categorization of 
interests will be incorporated into working hypotheses, representing state interests of energy 
security accumulation, economic interests and diplomatic interests respectively. The 
implications of the pursuit of these interests on sovereignty will be the main focus, determined 
through the relative autonomy of the Nigerian government.  
3.1. Energy Security Interests & Sovereignty 
In line with Neorealist assumptions of states as utility-maximising, unitary actors, the primary 
interest of the EU and China in Africa would be the accumulation of security. This security is 
often considered to be energy security, particularly since both the EU and China are net 
importers of oil and natural gas. The need to secure energy supplies externally in order to 
ensure military and economic growth is the motivating factor.  Considering the centrality of 
the issue, states will form agreements at the highest level to ensure supply of energy from a 
host state.96 Alden and Davies present the case of Block 18 in Angola, which was leased to a 
Chinese oil company after the Chinese government provided a $2 billion loan to the Angolan 
government, freeing it from its reliance on IMF funding.97 This state-level involvement was 
significant, as an Indian oil company had previously secured a deal with Shell to assume the 
lease for Block 18, and the decision to give the rights to a Chinese company was made at the 
last minute, following the aid agreement. The zero-sum nature is therefore apparent. 
Accordingly, if the assumption that energy accumulation is the primary concern of states 
holds, the first hypothesis may be stated as follows: 
Assumption 1. The EU and China both focus on stable energy procurement in Africa. 
                                                
95 See Peter Katzenstein & Ruda Sil (2008), ‘Eclectic Theorizing in the Study and Practice of International 
Relations’, in The Oxford Handbook of International Relations, Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal (eds.), Oxford: 
Oxford University Press: 109-129. 
96 If one state accrues oil, there is less left over for other states. See Waltz 2004: 2-6.  
97 Chris Alden and Martyn Davies (2006), ‘A Profile of the Operations of Chinese Multinationals in Africa’, 
South African Journal of International Affairs, 13 (1): 83-96. 
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The state-centric nature of energy procurement expected by the theory is likely to lead to 
support the elites in African circles, as they control the oil and gas reserves. This applies to 
both China and the EU, following de Oliveira’s argument that “the contrast between Chinese 
and Western oil business practice has been much exaggerated”, referring to the absence of a 
moral dimension in the oil sector in the West.98 Accordingly, the relatively new presence of 
China in Africa would lead to a continuation of the status quo, widening income gaps and 
prohibiting further development in favour of their own access to resources. Such a 
predicament is often termed a “resource curse”, as the possession of resources promotes 
rentierism, which has higher chances of corruption and the support of elite groups at the 
detriment of the masses.99 Even investments related to oil procurement such as the building of 
necessary infrastructure, large aid (or bribe) packages and high level diplomatic engagement 
brings benefits to the elite class alone, thereby undermining development and democracy.100 
This somewhat-Marxist critique of a realist-style pursuit of resources also eludes to an indirect 
undermining of sovereignty; the state-centric approach supports external sovereignty, while 
presuming that internal sovereignty is held. However, when this is not the case, supporting an 
elite class may be considered to be an indirect interference. Ergo:  
H1. The pursuit of energy security is likely to result in a resource curse, thereby indirectly 
undermining sovereignty. 
3.2. Economic Interests & Sovereignty 
From a Neoliberal perspective, internal preferences determine state policies. Such preferences 
are often stated as the attainment of a market for state exports, as a method to grow 
economically and accrue monetary hard power. The EU and China have different domestic 
preferences, based on conditions in which their businesses would thrive. As ‘champions’ of the 
neoliberal ideology, European companies are largely privatized and have the resources to 
thrive in a free global market. Supporting market liberalization and privatization through 
tied-aid therefore benefits Europe. Neoliberal ideology relies on transparency and fair 
competition for the market to be able to regulate itself, so the EU conditionality clauses that 
support global governance are explained as allowing their own firms to compete more fairly 
globally.  
                                                
98 De Oliveira 2008: 84. 
99 Clapham 2008: 363 
100 Mohan & Power 2008: 35. 
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On the Contrary, in China, the Go-Out policy only materialized in 2002, meaning 
Chinese firms, particularly state-owned ones, have less experience internationally and would 
be less able to compete in a free market globally. Support from the government in the form of 
diplomatic agreements with host economies and financial support for Chinese firms is 
therefore necessary for them to be successful in Africa.101 Since such methods are less effective 
in a free market, a closed market may be beneficial for Chinese firms. Having said that, 
China is understood as a great adaptor to political and economic contexts, and has a “perfect 
understanding of the liberal economy, including the huge opportunities it offers as well as the 
many flaws.”102 Indeed many argue that China benefits from the access to African markets 
afforded by SAPs in the 80s and 90s, and further gains political favour and economic benefits 
from African governments by “rejecting regulation efforts on the grounds of non-
interference”, suggesting a win-win for China itself as a free-rider in economic reform 
promoted by the West.103 Since China is able to cope with both economic systems and only 
needs to ensure access for their companies, tied-aid as a measure suits them as well: 
Assumption 2. The EU still promotes neoliberal ideologies while China promotes economic 
diversity through tied-aid to gain access to markets in Africa.  
The pursuit of neoliberal ideologies and conditionality attached to ‘tied-aid’ agreements is 
often cited as a direct limitation of African sovereignty, as market liberalization may reduce 
tariffs that could protect infant industries in developing states. Moreover, the fact that most 
exports from the continent are primary commodities means that liberalizing agriculture 
would inevitably hurt the economy as the EU and US place trade restrictions on this sensitive 
sector. Conditionality therefore limits the policy space available for African governments 
domestically, resulting in an infringement on sovereignty. Though China has gained a 
reputation for having no such claims, the recent promotion of CSR and government policies 
to abide by local rules and regulations is a key indicator that this had not been done before, 
thereby undermining existent policies in African states. Tying aid to Chinese state-owned and 
private contractors also limits policy space to a degree, as locals do not benefit. Further, much 
has been written on how infant manufacturing industries in Africa are unable to compete 
with the influx of cheap goods from China in textiles, electronics and household items, among 
                                                
101 Alden & Davies 2006: 90 
102 Adama Gaye (2008), ‘China in Africa: After the Gun and the Bible: A West African Perspective’ in Chris 
Alden, Daniel Large and Ricardo Soares de Oliveira (eds.), China Returns to Africa: A Rising Power and a Continent 
Embrace, London: Hurst & Company: 134; Holslag’s argument of china’s adaptation policy also supports this 
view (2011). 
103 Tull 2006: 473-4. 
China & the EU in Africa: 
Competing Approaches to Sovereignty 
27 
 
others, thereby resulting in job losses and an overreliance on primary industries. Since China 
itself initiated incremental reforms in order to protect its own ‘infant’ industries, it can be 
presumed that the state would be aware of the need for such protection, in the spirit of ‘south-
south’ solidarity. The failure to support such industrialization, or indeed technology transfer 
constitutes an indirect breech of sovereignty by exploiting the African market in a way that 
prevents it from developing through industrialization, due to the inability to compete with 
Chinese prices: 
H2. The EU’s approach constitutes a direct infringement on sovereignty, whereas the 
Chinese approach constitutes an indirect infringement.  
3.3. Diplomatic Interests & Sovereignty 
Assuming that actors are aware that their Africa Strategies do not exist in a vacuum and 
therefore impact their wider international relations and standing, scholars disagree on how 
approaches translate into broader implications. One perspective offered by Peter van Ham 
considers external activities in Africa in terms of “Social Power”. Social power is interpreted 
as one state exerting influence on another state in non-military ways, through the transfer of 
norms, standards and policy practices that ultimately benefit the donor. As Zaki Laïdi states, 
“Europe expresses, defends and promotes its social preferences through international or 
global norms [of] peace, liberty, democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights” 
with the purpose of expanding EU social power. Conditionality clauses are used to spread 
these norms and rules.104 Through this perspective, the Chinese strategy does not seem very 
different from the EU one, as some authors claim that the Chinese support for non-
intervention and respect for sovereignty is mainly used as a deterrent for other actors to get 
involved in Chinese policy making.105 Evidence for this is seen in the clear exception to the 
“non-conditionality” principle: the requirement for support for the ‘One-China Policy’ and 
the severance of diplomatic ties with Taiwan, which is adhered to in all but five African states. 
The pursuit of international support for norms that are upheld by China and the EU 
respectively is all the more important in the single group of states most prone to ‘bloc-voting’: 
Africa. Ultimately, if diplomatic support is zero-sum regarding somewhat contrasting norms 
of non-interference and the responsibility to protect, the EU and China’s policy of 
                                                
104 Zaki Laïdi (June 23-24, 2006), ‘Are European Preferences Shared by Others? – Keynote speech at 
SciencesPo’, Centre d’Etudes Européennes de Sciences Po, Paris: 4.  
105 Gazibo & Mbabia 2012: 24-5. 
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differentiating themselves from each other is understandable: 
Assumption 3. The EU prioritises governance in Africa, whereas China focuses on 
national sovereignty. 
The promotion of good governance through norms of peace, liberty, democracy, the rule of 
law and respect for human rights by the EU is seen by some as an imposition of ‘Western’ 
values that are projected as ‘universal’, and by others as a realization after years in Africa that 
supporting oppressive regimes is not sustainable, and that a long term institutionalization of 
certain policies will lead to development.106 Whereas the former view suggests an infringement 
of sovereignty, the latter suggests empowerment, and the strengthening of sovereignty in the 
future. The one distinction, however, is that the EU seems more concerned with internal 
elements of sovereignty in Africa, including legitimacy and the inclusion of groups 
domestically. The policies used by the EU in the end of the 20th Century certainly 
undermined sovereignty by subverting existent governments and funding aid programs 
through international organizations and non-profits. This put much pressure on post-conflict 
governments as they presented them as ineffective and incapable of ruling, in the effort to 
avoid corruption and rentierism. Though policies have been altered since, there is evidence 
that the EU still prefers to avoid funding governments, thereby undermining existent regimes 
and their internal sovereignty in the long-term. China, on the other hand, stands by the 
principles of non-interference and traditional sovereignty, which is an ‘external’ focus on the 
norm. The One-China principle indirectly undermines sovereignty, though, as it dictates the 
foreign policy of a state in order to receive Chinese funding. This has been relaxed to a 
degree, however PRC supporters still gain more aid and engagement than ROC (Taiwan) 
supporters.107 Moreover, the Chinese are often accused of targeting the elites above others, 
which results in widening inequality and also social turmoil. Moreover, some scholars claim 
that Chinese strategies especially feed authoritarian regimes, thereby inadvertently supporting 
a certain regime type in spite of constant rhetoric claiming the right of states to choose their 
own path to development. Regarding the opinion of the masses, authors state that “Africans 
know what justice is, and see China as helping elites subjugate them.” 108 Hence, one would 
expect the following: 
H3. The EU’s governance focus casts doubt on and undermines internal sovereignty, while 
China’s non-interference focus indirectly affects internal sovereignty. 
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3.4. Implications for Sovereignty 
Simply put, if sovereignty is adhered to through non-interference, then a breach of 
sovereignty would take place in the case of interference of a state’s affairs by an external 
actor. Implications for Sovereignty may therefore be conceptualized as follows, according to 
the pursuit of each of the interests outlined above: 
 
FIGURE 3: Theoretical Framework: Impact on Sovereignty 
 
As suggested in the literature review, Sovereignty is evidently affected in the event of an 
intervention, which would be a direct interference. Similarly, the Structural Adjustment 
Programs of the 1980s and 1990s would also fall under direct interference as they stipulate 
how states should conduct their policies. Indirect effects are rather underdeveloped, however, 
as by nature they are difficult to point out and the effects are not clear. There have been 
suggestions, however that both the EU and China support certain groups of actors over 
others, which have political implications. Both direct and indirect breeches of sovereignty 
weaken the traditional form of the norm, and further analysis should be considered to see 
whether they alter the norm to bring new meanings.  
 Alternatively, the purely ‘business’ form of approach of China, and new efforts at 
encouraging ownership by African states in EU policies may ensure that no interference 
occurs. In that case, instead of assuming that sovereignty is upheld, evidence is necessary to 
prove that it is respected or even strengthened. 
Interference in 
Domestic Affairs of  
the Host State? 
Yes
Direct  
(conditionality, 
intervention)
Indirect 
(support of  certain    
groups over others)
No Sovereignty strengthened?
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4. Research Design 
4.1. Methods 
This paper will use the merits of qualitative analysis in allowing for causal determination 
through a within-case study of two actors in Nigeria, in order to see whether and how they 
differ, and what the implications are for sovereignty. Process tracing will be adopted to 
determine any intervening variables or explanations for state interests in political-economic 
diversity and implications for sovereignty. Studies conducted by Africa experts will be 
considered and expanded in their relation to sovereignty where it has not yet been 
considered, particularly through extensive studies of Chinese and European activities in 
Africa conducted by Brautigam, Alden et al. and Power et al.109 Economic reports and news 
articles will also be considered, with much caution given to official statements by government 
officials that are likely to reflect priorities already stated in the white paper, and may be 
biased.110 A comparison of the Chinese and EU Strategic approaches to Africa will be 
conducted to define them and determine their impact on sovereignty in Africa. 
4.2. Concepts, Variables and Indicators 
The following categorization of concepts will be used to structure the analysis: 
Concept Variables Indicators 
Energy Security 
Interests 
Access to Resources 
 
Investment in strategic resources, 
particularly oil and gas. 
Economic Interests  Access to Markets Investment in strategic resources 
Investment in infrastructure 
Tied (conditional) aid agreements 
Diplomatic Interests Public Diplomacy 
Bilateral or multilateral 
diplomacy 
Cultural Centres 
Media promotion 
Multilateral forums 
High-level visits 
Impact on Sovereignty Interference in political 
sphere 
Direct (conditionality/intervention) 
Indirect (biased support) 
FIGURE 3: Interests, Variables and Indicators 
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4.2.1.	  Energy	  Security	  Interest	  Indicators	  
In order to determine states’ pursuit of energy security, information on investments in Africa 
will be used. Since the analysis focuses on state interests, state actions will be considered as 
opposed to private investments. The difficulty of accumulating such information lies with the 
lack of disclosure by the Chinese government. However, since the analysis is focused on trends 
and relative approaches, exact figures may be excluded. As a guideline, reports by the 
Economist, Ernst & Young, and the Chinese Business Review will be considered, as each 
provide indicators of levels of investment in oil and gas. Investment by the EU and its 
Member States are widely available through reports by the European Commission, and well 
documented by scholars. Though the EU largely promotes private investments, wider 
agreements such as the region-wide energy agreement provide incite on state-lead efforts of 
ensuring energy security. In-depth case studies by other scholars with a similar research focus 
in Nigeria will also be considered. 
4.2.2.	  Economic	  Interest	  Indicators	  
Economic Interests and Propaganda pertain to state party interests in maintaining their 
position, thereby focusing on job creation and tied aid agreements. Once again, state actions 
are paramount, and the creation of the $5 billion fund for Chinese state-owned enterprises to 
invest in China is of particular interest. Information on the industry sectors apart from oil and 
gas in sources for security indicators will therefore be used here.  
 In addition, the WTO provides information on free trade agreements, along with 
details of whether they hold preferential or ‘conditional’ characteristics. As both China and 
the EU are currently members of the organization, relevant data may be procured. 
4.2.3.	  Diplomatic	  Interest	  Indicators	  
For a state to wield soft power, it may use ‘currencies’ of values, culture, policies and 
institutions. These may be promoted through the use of public diplomacy, along with bilateral 
and multilateral diplomacy. Bull’s five components of Public Diplomacy provide indicators of 
states pursuing diplomatic interests.111 Additional indicators include bilateral diplomacy, 
through state visits, and multilateral diplomacy through the establishment of institutions, as 
well as economic incentives such as development aid. Cultural diplomacy is most explicitly 
exemplified in the establishment of language and culture centres, such as Confucius institutes 
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promoting Chinese language and culture around the world. Though such institutes are not 
always organized by the government, their existence is often explicit and may therefore be 
tracked. Furthermore, international broadcasting may be investigated through the Chinese 
provision of free news for networks in Africa, and European equivalents of the same. Activities 
of embassies may be more relevant for the EU than China, as the Chinese Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs is often considered to have little autonomy. The Chinese and European provision of 
scholarships and migration policies has been documented by Van der Putten et al. (2012) and 
the European Commission respectively.  Finally, bilateral diplomacy is widely reported in the 
news, regarding official state visits. Multilateral diplomacy is often also reported, for example 
information on the EU-Africa Summit, and the FOCAC summit respectively.  
4.2.4.	  Impact	  on	  Sovereignty	  Indicators	  
Impacts on Sovereignty are determined by the degree to which African governments are 
provided the policy space to develop their internal affairs. These include modes and sectors of 
development, trade agreements and policies, and judicial affairs. The degree to which external 
actors interfere with the government and politics of the host state determines the breach of 
sovereignty, whereas support for a country’s own determinants of policy would be strengthen 
the norm.  
 Direct breeches of sovereignty include intervention without the consent of the host 
state, or tied-agreements that dictate policies. Scholars focusing on the major relations 
between the states have examined the conditionalities behind agreements and accounts will be 
analysed. Indirectly invasive policies will be determined by the support of a certain ethnic or 
social group, public opinion and literature on the legitimacy of the current regime, as well as 
China and the EU’s activities in Nigeria.  
 Owing to the lack of literature in the field, these indicators are purposefully broad in 
order to provide a testing ground for further research. The implied and actual implications for 
sovereignty will be broadly defined, in order to provide insight on the status of the norm of 
Sovereignty today and future possibilities. The comparison of the ‘old’ and ‘new’ approaches 
to political-economic diversity and subsequently sovereignty is necessary to determine the 
extent of compatibility and influence on the cornerstone of International Relations in previous 
centuries.  
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4.3. Case Selection 
Though many actors have diplomatic and economic ties with Africa, the most influential ones 
at the time of writing are the US, the EU and China, with the US and EU models commonly 
grouped together ideologically, and the Chinese one presented as a contrast.112 Due to space 
limitations, it is important to contrast two concrete strategies in depth, and therefore a 
selection between the US and EU would be beneficial. Considering the fact that the EU is the 
largest donor in Development Aid at the time of writing, with Sub-Saharan Africa being the 
largest recipient, there is a strong motivation for a focus on the EU-Africa Strategy. Moreover, 
Sino-US relations are deeply complex, incorporating security issues that have dragged on 
since the proxy wars of the cold war. Isolating sovereignty approaches would therefore be 
considerably more difficult than with the EU, whose foreign policy concerns with China meet 
most directly in Africa.113 
The study will consider a timeframe of 2000 to the present in order to allow for a 
proper representation of the EU and China’s contemporary policies in Africa. It should be 
noted that the EU as an actor in Africa emerged around the 1990s, just as China made its 
abrupt appearance.114 In order to determine the motivation for policies in Africa by China 
and the EU, the study will focus on an in-depth case study of Nigeria, as it possesses the 
necessary variables needed to test the hypotheses.  
Firstly, Nigeria’s extensive oil reserves, and relative stability compared to the larger 
producers of Angola and particularly Sudan provide great incentives for investment in energy 
                                                
112 Image Sources: http://www.dw.de/merkel-will-continue-human-rights-crusade-at-africa-summit/a-
2992364; http://proudlyafrikan.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/CHINESE-AFRICA.jpg (Accessed 
12/02/2013) 
113 Van der Meulen & van der Putten 2009: 2. 
114 Clapham 2008: 361. 
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security. On-going tension between the North and South of the country provides some 
security threats, thereby providing a ‘most-likely’ indicator of EU and Chinese intervention in 
state affairs to protect their energy security interests. Considering the falling number of civil 
conflicts on the continent, the behaviour of external states in less severe episodes is more 
generalizable.  
Second, Nigeria is the most populous African country, with 171 million inhabitants, 
providing a large market along with its extensive oil reserves. The country has also been listed 
among the “Next 11” economies and growth opportunities are vast. If the hypothesis that 
higher levels of interest correlate with the need for intervention is correct, then Nigeria would 
also provide a most-likely case for intervention in domestic affairs.   
Finally, Nigeria’s size, stability and general clout on the continent make it strategically 
important for European and Chinese diplomatic interests. It therefore provides a most-likely 
case for European and Chinese involvement, that would likely lead to indirect intervention in 
an effort to protect their respective interests.  
Considering the case of Nigeria will allow for process tracing to determine how the 
EU and China pursue their interests, and the extent of their subsequent intervention on 
Nigerian sovereignty. The causality of their respective Africa Strategies will be discussed, 
which would not be possible through a large-N study. 
 
5. Case Study: Nigeria  
5.1. The EU in Nigeria: Subjective Sovereignty 
5.1.0.	  The	  EU	  in	  Nigeria:	  Historical	  Overview	  
The EU’s focus on development in Africa has roots in the 1957 Treaty 
of Rome, which established the European Economic Community, 
uniting member states’ economic policies to a degree for the first time. 
The treaty established provisions for the creation of the European 
Development Fund (EDF) for technical and financial assistance to 
African countries which were still colonised or which had historical ties 
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with the Member States.115 As Brautigam explains, the modus of relations at the time involved 
a top-down approach of modernization with the aim of ‘catching up’ with the industrialized 
countries by using Western technology, equipment and seeds to build infrastructure and 
install electricity. This process would be accelerated by aid, and the debt repaid with future 
earnings from investments.116 The British ‘Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria’ took an $80 
million loan from the EDF at its inception to build a hydropower dam on the Niger River. 
Nigeria gained independence from the United Kingdom in 1960, and was declared a 
Republic in 1963. The failure of aid received to ‘trickle down’ exacerbated social tensions in 
the country, with regional inequality and perceived corruption generated by rapid growth 
resulting in several military coups following the 1966 elections. This eventually resulted in the 
30-month Biafran civil war, and rule by Military Juntas.117 
 The 1970s oil boom in Nigeria saw great economic growth, however the military 
administration did not focus on equality or economic security by investing in infrastructure or 
building local capacities. Instead, the state exhibited ‘rentier’ characteristics with a growing 
elite and over-reliance on oil revenues. The EU condemned the military regimes and largely 
cut ties with Nigeria from 1970 to 1998, suspending military cooperation and training, 
imposing travel restrictions on security forces as well as an arms embargo and suspending 
most development cooperation. EU companies, particularly the oil giants Shell and Total 
maintained operations in spite of the undemocratic system that soured political relations.118 
The EDF followed the lead of the World Bank in shifting the focus from building 
infrastructure to funding the ‘green revolution’ in agriculture.119 Much of these efforts were 
also aimed at preventing Soviet influence in Africa during the Cold War, with unnecessarily 
complex Integrated Rural Development (IRD) programs that were designed to address basic 
needs and improve farm incomes. This ‘welfare’ focus, in contrast with the ‘capacity building’ 
focus lead previously, reflected a view of the West that African states were incapable of 
providing for their own citizens, and required external support. In order to avoid the 
perceived corruption of the state, then, the EU channelled funds to non-governmental 
                                                
115 1957 Treaty of Rome: provisions established under Articles 131 and 136 
116 Brautigam 2011: 27. 
117 Ibid.: 28. 
118 Anna Kakhee (2007), ‘EU Democracy Promotion in Nigeria: Between Realpolitik and Idealism’, Fundación par 
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119 Dino Mahtani (2006), ‘Nigeria turns to China for defence aid’, Financial Times, Retrieved from 
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organizations (NGOs), which ended up managing “40 to 50 per cent of health facilities… in 
many African countries.”120 
The end of the Cold War brought some stability with the reduction of funding for 
militants and autocratic regimes, and the EU lifted the travel restrictions and embargoes 
following the elections of May 1999.121 Nigeria became party to the Cotonou Agreement of 
2000 between EU and ACP states with a view towards poverty eradication, sustainable 
development and the integration of ACP states to the global economy. A €100 million ‘quick-
start assistance’ package was promptly granted, followed by a sum of approximately €600 
million between 2001-2007, the largest sum given to any ACP country during the period.122 
The failure of the military regimes to diversify the economy away from the capital-intensive 
oil sector means that 80% of budgetary revenues and 95% of foreign exchange earnings still 
depend on oil. Economic reforms were therefore a large part of the $1 billion IMF stand-by 
agreement granted to Nigeria in August 2000 and subsequent debt-restructuring deal of 
US$18 billion from the Western ‘Paris Club’.123 Though Nigeria pulled out of the IMF 
program in 2002 as it was unable to meet spending and exchange rate targets, the 
conditionality-tied deal brings us to our period of analysis, to be conducted by area of interest. 
 
5.1.1.	  The	  EU	  in	  Nigeria:	  Energy	  Security	  Interests	  
As the continued presence of oil companies in spite of the 
cutting of diplomatic ties between the EU and Nigeria for 
thirty years suggests, the oil sector is traditionally “absent 
from the moral dimension” of Western policies.124 Indeed 
western oil companies cooperate with Chinese companies 
and invest with them too, in spite of criticism by the EU 
regarding a lack of governance.125 One particularly striking 
case that demonstrates the lack of CSR and governance by 
EU companies is the oil-rich Niger Delta, which has 
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“endured the equivalent of the Exxon Valdez spill every year for 50 years by some 
estimates”— approximately 11 million gallons per annum.126 The Niger Delta is an oil rich 
region, which contributed approximately 80% of government revenues while only retaining 
13% from taxes on oil and other natural resources produced locally in 2001.127 The Dutch Oil 
company Shell has developed and exported oil from the region for half a century, however 
does not seem to have contributed to the development of the country. Though Nigeria is the 
eighth largest oil producer in the world, with an output of 2.5 million barrels of crude oil a 
day, the country lacks an oil producing and processing system, and relies on imports for 
petrol.128 The West attributes the failure of oil wealth to trickle down to the rest of the 
population to political instability, corruption, inadequate infrastructure and poor 
macroeconomic management. On the other hand, Chinese perspectives blame their greed:129  
“Over the years, since Western oil companies have been only 
concerned with their own economic interests and have neglected 
environmental protection in oil producing areas and the local peoples’ 
ability to develop their economy, the constant flow of ‘oil dollars’ has 
only filled the pockets of Western oil companies and some corrupt 
African officials, instead of bringing benefits to local people. On the 
contrary, the unequal distribution of wealth and ‘black gold’ resources 
has led to internal conflicts.”  
 
Such internal conflicts were apparent in February 2006, when one fifth of Nigeria’s oil 
production was shut down due to militant attacks on oil facilities and the kidnapping of 
foreign oil workers. The EU and US were hesitant to provide more support due to “concerns 
over the level of corruption within the Nigerian security forces and human rights violations”, 
evidence against the complete ‘lack of moral element’ in spite of oil interests.130 Oil from 
Nigeria accounted for 5.83% of total Crude Oil imports in the EU in 2011, a significant 
amount.131 The EU has been active in a broader variety of sectors, however, which demand 
consideration. 
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5.1.2.	  The	  EU	  in	  Nigeria:	  Economic	  Interests	  
The debt restructuring deal from the Paris Club and IMF conditional credits were granted to 
then-president Obasanjo in order to work towards realising Nigeria’s great economic 
potential. The country is currently listed as one of the ‘Next 11’ economies of the world 
alongside Turkey and Indonesia, as a further reflection of this potential, however the West 
believes that ongoing structural issues prohibit its realisation of this. The Joint Africa EU 
Strategy (JAES) signed at the EU-Africa Summit in Lisbon in 2007 shows a marked change in 
strategy from the development policies of the 50s. Firstly, the change in name from the ‘EU-
Africa Strategy’ to JAES illustrates this shift in policy, which no doubt came as a result of 
criticism from previous efforts. The principles of the JAES are Ownership, referring to the 
promotion of the involvement of recipient states in the decision-making process; Institutional 
Coherence, supporting regionalisation through EPAs to promote competition domestically, 
realise economies of scale, promote technology transfers and stimulate cooperation; and 
Policy Coherence, encouraging greater coordination within and between member states of 
the EU and its organs.132 The ownership principle in particular is seen as an important shift in 
policy, supporting sovereignty by including the state in the negotiations and allowing for 
provisions of technology transfer, a key component for industrialization and economic 
growth.133 These are hardly realised in practice, however, as projects are often contracted to 
external actors, and 25% of construction projects are now undertaken by Chinese firms in 
Africa, meaning that the technological knowledge is not shared locally. In fact, more and 
more agreements are won by Chinese firms due to their price competitiveness and 
conditionality-free agreements. EU actors however still feel that poor implementation is to 
blame and not fatigue with years of deficient development plans from the West. For example, 
the response of the president of the European Investment Bank (EIB) to losing contracts to 
Chinese banks was to accuse them of “unscrupulous” behaviour, snatching projects “from 
under the EIB’s nose” with their lack of labour and environmental conditions.134 Marchal 
captures the tendency for biased understandings well:  
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“Information about Chinese businesses is often collected from direct 
(European) competitors who do not hesitate to describe their rivals’ 
presence in terms of ‘the victory of vice over virtue’, the Chinese 
appearing as a disruptive presence for Western companies that were 
finally about to develop Africa.”135  
 
 A subsequent dilemma faced by the EU in Nigeria is how to preserve their economic 
interests without undermining structures crucial to building successful market economies, that 
would ensure long-term benefits.136 In other words, direct competition with the Chinese may 
require the lowering of standards and cutting of costs, which would go against their normative 
interests in the country. In the long-term, however, legal policy and institutional frameworks 
are required to create a stable market economy, “with greater security and less variability in 
the conditions that affect [people’s] livelihoods.”137 The prevailing EU belief is that good 
governance is a prerequisite to realize growth. 
 The ownership principle, though a step in the right direction of supporting 
sovereignty, is fundamentally limited by the existence of conditionality clauses, however. 
Though Nigeria backed out of the 2000 agreement, the 2008 proposal from the IMF was also 
riddled with conditionality, though the government exhibited a willingness to implement the 
necessary reforms this time. This included modernization of the banking system, the removal 
of subsidies and attempts to address the security issues in the Niger Delta.138 Some argue that 
the change came with the loss of “monopolistic grips on power”, which allowed for more 
multiparty democracy, with technocrats replacing former bureaucrats and the introduction of 
modern economic policies.139 Exchange rates were lowered to allow for more competitive 
rates for agricultural exports, which benefitted the rural poor. Though obstacles remained, 
sectors of the population that previously had no access to external markets were now able to 
participate actively. GDP levels rose between 2007 and 2012 as a result of growth in the non-
oil sectors and high global crude oil prices, and President Jonathan has expressed the goal of 
improving governance measures in the future. Such proclamations are taken sceptically by 
many authors, as are the signing of EPA agreements, as states often sign in order to avoid 
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losing favourability with their primary donor.140 In spite of efforts at change, then, it appears 
“Western nations continue to seek virtual control of African economies by means of the 
international financial structure, like the IMF and the World Bank, still under its 
domination.”141  
 It should be noted that macroeconomic policy may also support sovereignty, through 
the increased ability of states to react to market situations. For example, the reforms 
promoted by Structural Adjustment Programs allowed Nigeria to take advantage of the peak 
of commodity prices before the global recession in early 2008. The inflationary oil prices 
above $100 a barrel in early 2008 were budgeted conservatively, assuming that they were $65 
a barrel, so the state had a cushion to fall back on when prices plummeted later that year. 
Since this was a regional improvement, sub-Saharan African maintained an annual growth 
rate of 5% in spite of the volatility of international markets. Hypothesis 2 is therefore 
somewhat supported through the case, as top-down policies infringe on sovereignty, however 
when effective may end up strengthening sovereignty. 
	  
5.1.3.	  The	  EU	  in	  Nigeria:	  Diplomatic	  Interests	  
Decades of involvement, under the auspices of ‘development cooperation’ in sub-Saharan 
Africa, with little to show for in terms of concrete achievements has lead many to claim that 
the West has lost its legitimacy in the region.142 The lack of coordination between EU 
member states further exacerbates efforts, due to divergent interests within and between states 
both in Africa and the EU, as well as institutions.143 For example, Germany’s position has 
shifted over the years from one of reluctance to readiness to support European Development 
Program missions, while France and Portugal have voiced the desire for a fair balance 
between development funds they receive and those going outside of the EU.144 Consequently, 
diplomatic efforts are often stunted. For example, UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown 
boycotted the EU Africa Summit in Lisbon, 2007 due to the presence of the controversial 
President of Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe. 145  
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The considerable resources spent on health and education over the last decade has not 
been matched with quality and accessibility; “enrolment rates have risen dramatically, but 
learning outcomes have hardly changed, and only 2 in 5 young adults complete secondary 
school.”146 Studies on diverted funding do support the EU’s insistence on the need for 
governance, as “the amount of funding an African school receives likely depends on the 
principal’s ties to a government bureaucrat or local politician.”147 
As far as the development of norms is concerned, the EU greatly supported the 
development of the African Peer Review Mechanism as part of NEPAD, as a tool for regional 
democratic supervision in March 2003. The mechanism requires transparent reporting of 
government affairs, economic policies and human rights conditions, as well as supervision and 
assessment of member states’ according to developed standards. Compliance mechanisms 
include demands for reforms and the ability to put forward suggestions. Nigeria is among the 
24 countries that have joined this quest to promote governance in the region. Moreover, the 
shift from pure ‘non-interference’ to ‘non-indifference’ in the AU charter provided the AU 
Peace and Security Council the right to intervene in member state affairs in the case of war 
crime, genocide, crimes against humanity and serious threats to law and order in the region. 
These events show an acceptance of EU norms of regional governance and subjective 
sovereignty, though these are not shared by all states equally.148  
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5.1.6.	  The	  EU	  in	  Nigeria:	  Implications	  for	  Sovereignty	  
The EU’s “Rights-based agenda”, as termed by Mohan and Power, continues to dominate its 
relations with Nigeria, in spite of efforts at promoting ownership in agreements.149 As a result, 
sovereignty is undermined to the extent that economic reforms are required for assistance, 
thereby dictating domestic policy. Having said that, the reflection of some of these norms in 
African mechanisms including NEPAD and the AU suggests that they have been engendered 
by some circles within the region itself. If this is the case, the impact on sovereignty is 
lessened, at least as it pertains to the imposition of governance, as it appears to be accepted as 
necessary within the region itself. Economic policies, on the other hand, continue to be 
imposed. This further supports the concept of the EU’s view of sovereignty as ‘Subjective’. 
 
5.2. China in Nigeria: Defensive Sovereignty 
5.2.0.	  China	  in	  Nigeria:	  Historical	  Overview	  
Considering the extent of Sino-Nigerian relations today, it is surprising that Nigeria was not 
included in the Bandung conference, or Chinese premier Zhou Enlai’s 10 country trip to 
Africa in 1963. As Utomi explains, “the Conservative Nigerian government in Lagos at 
independence was an unlikely ally of a communist government and did not rush to embrace 
its Chinese counterpart.”150 Instead, the ROC remained Nigeria favoured trading partner in 
the 1970s.  Diplomatic relations with the PRC strengthened in the 1970s with the mutual 
support for national liberation movements across Africa. Nigeria further supported the ‘One 
China, Two Systems’ policy that saw the return of Hong Kong to China by the 1990s, 
however high level visits were few and far between.151 Some argue that the nations grew closer 
“as a result of the international isolation and Western condemnation of Nigeria’s military 
regimes (1970-1998).”152 China has provided extensive economic, military and political 
support since this period, and is becoming one of Nigeria’s main suppliers of military 
hardware following the hesitation of the West to deal in arms supplies in the region. 
Economic activities were ongoing during the period, with an aid agreement negotiated on 
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recognition of the PRC in 1971. Chinese aid teams registered as local companies upon 
completion of construction projects, and when China joined the World Bank in 1980 and 
Asian Development Bank (ADB) in 1985, these private companies were eligible to bid on 
construction projects financed by the international development banks. This strategy 
therefore demonstrated aid as a ‘springboard’ for investment, and the beginning of China’s 
strategy of tying political and economic interests.153  
China’s shift from a net exporter to a net importer of crude oil pronounced a new interest 
in Nigeria, with the volume of trade between the two states rapidly increasing from 1.3 billion 
Nigerian naira in 1990 to 8.6 billion, mostly attributable to the oil sector, with a small amount 
from imports of cheaply manufactured goods and products from China. The sudden influx of 
Chinese goods lead to allegations of ‘dumping’ by Nigerians in 1996, though China 
responded coolly, claiming the questionable-quality goods were ordered by Nigerian 
businessmen, and any blame was theirs alone to hold.154 Another explanation was that 
president Obasanjo “courted the Chinese at the expense of local manufacturers by 
manipulating tariffs to encourage Chinese imports”, placing the responsibility with poor 
policy options that stifled the competitiveness of domestic production.155 Nevertheless, the 
establishment of the China-Africa Cooperation Forum (FOCAC) catalysed agreements by the 
turn of the century, and the beginning of our period of analysis. 
	  
5.2.1.	  China	  in	  Nigeria:	  Energy	  Security	  Interests	  
China’s pursuit of energy security has been clear through its investments by SOEs, including 
the $800 million deal to supply PetroChina with 30,000 barrels a day of Oil in 2007, and 
US$2.3 billion deal to CNOOC for an oil block in Nigeria. Indeed these deals are part of the 
80% of all aid provided by China’s EximBank that goes to oil producers, highlighting the 
importance given to energy security in China’s foreign policy.156 For China, oil interests and 
bilateral relations “go hand in hand”, with grand ‘Natural resource for repayment’ schemes 
implemented, including the construction of a US$298 million turbine power plant in 2005, 
with repayment guaranteed through the supply of Oil.157 This is in spite of Chinese claims 
that it does not link credit lines with oil production, an activity ‘frowned upon by the IMF’ 
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due to the effect that tied aid has on increasing the debt burden for recipient states.158  
 China’s SOE’s arguably would not have been able to compete globally without state 
support and financing, which is granted as energy security is linked to broader diplomatic 
goals of avoiding confrontation with the US and projecting the image of a peaceful and 
responsible rising power in IR.159 CNOOC’s entry into the Niger Delta was timed during the 
insurgency in order to capitalize on the lack of competition as larger and more experienced 
firms were deterred. De Oliviera argues that Chinese package deals were aimed at cementing 
Nigerian good will, investing in unstable sectors with questionable profitability in order to 
gain favour with elites and access to more lucrative deals.160 As a result of the suggestion that 
China may invest in Nigeria’s crumbling railway system as well as the unstable Niger Delta 
oil block in 2006, CNPC was “awarded rights of first refusal on a number of oil licenses.”161 
Such risky investments are only possible through the easy access to financing offered to 
Chinese SOE’s. 
 The support of state leaders does not guarantee security, however, and the kidnapping 
of 9 Chinese oil workers by armed militants in January 2007 illustrated the instabilities caused 
by continued poverty in the region. Moreover, 5 Chinese telecommunications workers were 
abducted for two weeks.162 Some explain these trends as anti-Chinese sentiments, an 
argument backed by the subsequent refusal of some Chinese deals by the Nigerian state “in 
an effort to limit the Chinese presence in the country.”163 Power, Mohan and Mullins explain 
this as the result of the changing of power away from President Obasanjo around 2007, 
“which meant that many of the agreements entered into with the Chinese were not 
enforced.”164 Still a third argument points to kidnapping as an ‘endemic’ part of wider petro-
politics and inequality rather than anti-Chinese motivations.165  
The New Strategic Partnership speech given by President Hu Jintao to the Nigerian 
parliament during his April visit in 2006 called for “consolidation of cooperation in the 
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political, economic, cultural and security fields, as well as in international affairs… with 
emphasis on mutual trust and support.”166 The President acknowledged China’s severe energy 
shortage and escalating competition in its domestic market, and it’s Go-out policy that 
includes “offering an increasing amount of assistance to hasten the continent’s development”, 
thereby clearly stating their interests in Nigeria. The ‘New’ security idea was based on 
growing trends of collective security and interdependence to “shape an international 
environment favourable for common development.” Power, Mohan and Mullins explain this 
as China’s pragmatic realisation that “accumulation requires stability” and subsequent 
consideration of the need to intervene in African governance.167  
The evidence therefore suggests that while China pursues its own interests in the oil 
sector, and benefits certainly accrue to elites, with continued inequalities suggesting a resource 
curse, recent events have suggested that this trend is changing, with efforts to tackle 
governance through the New Strategic Partnership. Since the partnership focuses on 
‘cooperation’, the description shows potential for support of African sovereignty, suggesting 
that governance may support sovereignty in the long run. 
 
5.2.2.	  China	  in	  Nigeria:	  Economic	  Interests	  
“China’s second-biggest trading partner, an important source for future petroleum and gas 
supplies, and a country with strong ties to Western businesses, has enjoyed increasing 
attention as a strategic country of focus for the Chinese”.168 China has arguably taken 
advantage of liberalization promoted through SAPs to provide access to markets.169 Many 
SOEs have been involved in infrastructure, agriculture and communications, and FOCAC 
2006 provided provisions for the doubling of aid to the region by 2009. 170 In order to 
coordinate Chinese actors in Nigeria, a Centre for trade and investment promotion was 
established171, which eventually supported the establishment of a Special Economic Zone, 
currently under construction172 
 The Lekki Free Trade Zone was established in Nigeria due to its large domestic 
market and proximity to West African and European markets, with an expected attraction of 
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US$5 billion in investments. A second zone is planned near Ogun state. The Chinese 
government provides funding for these zones through the CADFund, and subsidies to firms 
interested in investing in them. The Zones are “intended to promote China’s foreign 
commercial interests and create safe havens for Chinese capital, therefore mainly helping 
Chinese companies through clusters for competitiveness.”173 Theoretically, the clusters may 
generate spill-overs downstream and promote arenas for technology transfer in their locality, 
however tangible results have yet to be realized in other such zones in the region. On the 
contrary, the zones may have a negative net effect due to the influx of imports of 
manufactured products from China that may “undermine the already weak manufacturing 
sectors” locally.174 It should be noted that manufacturing is another area that China has 
entered in without competition, as the West provides little assistance in this sector due to its 
lack of profitability.175 
 
 In spite of all these developments, structural issues remain, notably the trucking 
monopoly and lack of basic infrastructure such as running water that is in decline due to poor 
maintenance and corruption. The lack of human capital restricts the extent to which 
technology transfers would be possible anyway, as education levels have not improved 
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greatly.176 Although the telecommunication giant Huawei established a training centre in 
Nigeria, positions would only be available to those with access to basic education.177 As Utomi 
claims, “language barriers and cultural differences weigh heavily against the transfer of 
technological skills and education from Chinese to Nigerian citizens.”178  
In cases where Chinese firms hire locally, Nigerians often take offence to the poor labour 
standards exhibited, particularly following the September 2002 fire at a factory in Lagos in 
which the foreman locked the building doors, trapping 37 Nigerians. Further, some small 
businesses directly infringed on Nigerian sovereignty by openly selling contraband items, yet 
officials could not close down the area permanently as shoppers protested about the loss of 
access to cheap Chinese goods.179 
 Impacts on Sovereignty in the economic realm are hard to identify as private actors 
do not represent Chinese state actions. As such, a private company that breaks Nigerian law 
cannot represent the state’s breach of sovereignty, particularly in light of recent 
encouragements by the state for greater CSR efforts. Having said that, the evidence for 
potential gains from China’s “win-win” policies tend to be overshadowed by losses, and the 
continued overreliance on primary goods. Indeed the small textile industry that had been set 
up by natives of Hong Kong in the 1960s was swept away in light of Chinese imports. In this 
case, one might point the finger at the SAPs that called for market liberalization and exposed 
infant industries, however the respect of national territory may also be understood as the 
responsibility to do no harm to another state. By hurting the potential for industrialization in 
an already weak state, and preventing growth through technological transfer, the current state 
of events seems to exhibit neo-colonial tendencies that stunt progress.  
 
5.2.3.	  China	  in	  Nigeria:	  Diplomatic	  Interests	  
“China insists it does not use arms sales for diplomatic or political ends, and analysts say 
Beijing has been willing to approve weapons shipments to almost any willing state buyer.”180 
Mahtani encompasses the debate around Chinese diplomatic engagement in Nigeria, 
particularly with regards to tied aid agreements. There have been broader efforts at cultural 
diplomacy however, with scholars pinpointing the similarities between China and Africa, 
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including community values, and ‘pragmatism’ with regards to human rights and 
sovereignty.181 China’s stance is that the regions should strengthen cultural linkages in order 
to achieve ‘harmony’ with respect for diversity, where “different civilizations coexist in the 
spirit of tolerance and equality, while also learning from each other.”182 Exchanges vary from 
scholarships to Chinese medical teams and training programs. Moreover Nigeria is now hope 
to 3 Confucius Institutes, or Chinese culture and language centres often considered to wield 
soft power.183 
 Elite relations still seem to overpower Sino-Nigerian relations, as was demonstrated by 
the decision to relocate a major industrial park from Iwo State to Ogun state, the home 
province of former president Obasanjo. Though claiming that the ‘high-risk’ status of the 
Niger Delta Region was the cause for this sudden change of plans, the generally risk-loving 
nature of Chinese SOEs and proximity to the former politician make this questionable.184  
 If funding elites constitutes a breach of sovereignty, particularly in light of supporting 
a certain form of regime type over others, then China may be accused of indirectly 
compromising Nigerian sovereignty. Indeed transparency ratings have fallen in the oil-rich 
state in recent years, in spite of great efforts at improving governance. Brautigam’s response 
to concerns that “China is making corruption worse” says it all: Not worse, but definitely not 
better; “Civil society in Nigeria worried that some $4 billion in Chinese ‘aid’ … on the table 
in 2006 and 2008 would ‘end up in the ruling party’s coffers”185 
 
5.1.3.	  China	  in	  Nigeria:	  Implications	  for	  Sovereignty	  
Though the FOCAC Summit in 2006 upheld respect for sovereignty, empirical benefits of 
subsequent ODA and OOF has mainly accrued to the elites, thereby widening inequality and 
potentially undermining development.186 The evidence shows an overwhelmingly internal 
focus in Chinese policies, with benefits accruing to Chinese actors or a limited number of 
strategically selected elites. The rhetoric is therefore evidence of China’s view of Sovereignty 
as a Defensive measure to achieve its goals. 
 Meanwhile, the value gap is widening in Nigeria, with the GINI index of income 
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inequality having increased from 42.93 to 48.83 between 2004 and 2010, where perfect 
equality would have an index of 0.187 Though the change is not extreme, this is in light of 
efforts of governance by the Nigerian government and the willingness to submit itself to 
economic reforms and scrutiny by the IMF. The evidence of indirectly hurting sovereignty 
through increased income inequality that would result in sustained insecurity, particularly in 
the Niger Delta is therefore present. 
6. Conclusions 
6.1. Limitations 
This thesis is certainly not the final word for interests and sovereignty in International 
Relations, and may raise more questions in the subject matter. A number of limitations 
should be addressed to better understand the scope of conditions of the findings and relevance 
for theory and policy. Firstly, theories of power are not without their limitations, and may 
underrepresent the position of less developed nations in negotiations. African agency is 
certainly underdeveloped in the analysis, and the responsibility of the state itself is assumed as 
forgiven at times. Furthermore, the arguments do not address other factors such as culture or 
history. Nevertheless, a smart power perspective certainly adds value to the analysis as it 
considers the interrelationship between interests and how they are pursued. Since the analysis 
focused on the EU and China’s pursuit of interests as middle powers in the International 
System, it did not quite focus on the agency of other powers. 
Second, the issues associated with considering the EU as a single entity, and not 
looking at all individual member states cannot be overlooked. Interestingly, Carbone states 
that EU institutions each have different interests regarding China in Africa, with the 
Commission focusing on establishing the EU as an influential global actor, the Parliament 
focusing on establishing a “value-based development policy”, and the Council driven by 
“emotional reactions of some member states.”188 Nevertheless, for the sake of comparison, 
scholars often adopt a macro-level of analysis, as EU member states and institutions tend to 
                                                
187 Fijałowski: 231; World Bank Indicators, Retrieved from http://www.tradingeconomics.com/nigeria/gini-
index-wb-data.html (Accessed 02/06/13) 
188 Maurizio Carbone (2011), ‘The European Union and China’s rise in Africa: Competing visions, external 
coherence and trilateral cooperation’, Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 29 (2): 203. 
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exhibit a “conscious aspiration to achieve a common policy”, particularly regarding the 
European Africa policy.189 Recent years have shown a scaling back of individual member state 
diplomatic missions and the increasing use of EU offices on the continent, a concept 
‘unthinkable’ to China, but more supportive of a macro-level approach.190 Indeed a large part 
of the EU’s reach worldwide stems from established relationships held by its member states. 
The UK’s relations with Nigeria are therefore important for EU capabilities in the country, 
particularly because of the colonial and post-independence history.  
 Some authors argue for the consideration of non-state Chinese actors in Africa, in 
order to encompass the diversity of actors “who were simply not present a generation ago: 
provincial governments, giant oil and construction firms and the great new wave of individual 
retailers, doctors, restaurant operators and other entrepreneurs.”191 The main argument is 
that a state-centred approach does not encompass these autonomous actors, however since 
our focus is on sovereignty, the state level is important to consider in detail. Moreover, many 
of these new actors are active in large part due to the tied-aid agreements established by the 
government that grant private Chinese actors easy access to the African market.  
Generalizations of Africa are certainly problematic, due to the varying development 
indicators between countries and regions on the continent that are too vast to be ignored. 
Though the EU has special agreements with Northern Africa and South Africa, and China 
seems to set the former apart, the countries included in their broad Africa Strategies do not 
always overlap.192. A focus on sub-Saharan Africa has been selected to control for vast 
disparities in development levels between the cases. Further, relatively developed states such 
as South Africa (illustrated in Figure 1) have not been selected as case studies for the same 
reason- whereas South Africa fits into the 5,000-15,000 dollars per capita bracket, Nigeria 
claims a GDP per capita between 1,000-3,000.  
 Finally, the danger of equifinality associated with qualitative analyses must not be 
disregarded- indeed evidence may be consistent with several alternative explanations. As an 
exploratory study, however, it was necessary to leave room for a clearer picture of actor 
involvement, the interests motivating them and implications for sovereignty. 
                                                
189 Steiler 2009: 43. 
190 Alden, Large & de Oliveira 2008: 10-11. 
191 Snow 2008: xvi. 
192 Fijałkowski 2011: 227. 
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6.3. Concluding Remarks 
This study of the various interests pursued by states and their subsequent impact on the norm 
of sovereignty finds more similarities than differences between the interests and methods of 
the EU and China. Specifically, both states pursue ‘Smart Strategies’ to attain their goals, 
mixing issue areas as a bargaining tool to maximise their gain in foreign interactions. The 
differences lie in their histories and domestic priorities, which in turn influence their 
normative stances respectively. From this perspective, the EU, as a ‘normative power’ largely 
responsible for the framing of the current world system vis-à-vis International Organizations 
such as the UN and Bretton Woods Institutions, has an interest in maintaining this position. 
Leading discussions on norms, rights and responsibilities allows the EU to frame a system that 
it may thrive in, with open markets for its multinationals to thrive, and the growing 
acceptance of the need for governance and, in some circles, democracy. For the EU, then, 
Sovereignty is Subjective, or contextual, and determined by the fulfilment of governance. For 
China, a state with growing power eager not to upset the international system and turn great 
powers against them, while maintaining its assertiveness for the sake of stability, Sovereignty 
is paramount. Since this primacy stems from a desire to prevent interference in its own affairs, 
it demonstrates Defensive Sovereignty. 
These distinctions are not as polarized as previous literature suggests, and are 
certainly not set in stone. Indeed the case study shows the EU’s attempts at bringing 
sovereignty back into ODA through the introduction of the ‘ownership’ principle. On China’s 
side, the case of Darfur and increasing literature on the status of sovereignty also 
demonstrates the possibility for a change of stance.  
This thesis provides an important contribution to the growing literature on China in 
Africa, in contrast to more traditional actors. Though some claim that the loss of legitimacy of 
the West created the policy space for China to spread its influence on the continent, we have 
seen that both actors exhibit influence on the continent in different contexts. The loss of 
‘monopoly on assistance’, if you will, with a greater variety of actors from across the globe 
provides Africans with the opportunity to play interests against each other to maximise their 
own gains. There is certainly no quick fix to issues of development, governance, and security, 
however China’s rapid expansion on the continent does demonstrate the potential that can be 
reached, even by an emergent state, in the world.  
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6.3. Implications 
7.2.1.	  Implications	  for	  Theory	  and	  Areas	  for	  Further	  Research	  
The question of how states engage with less developed countries has implications for theory as 
it tests their applicability to empirical cases. As the study has shown, neorealism, neo-liberal 
institutionalism and public diplomacy theories all highlight certain interests over others, when 
policy often encompasses their collective pursuit. Furthermore, the analysis of how energy 
security interests, economic interests and diplomatic interests influence policy allows for better 
predictions of state actions, which is of interest both to actors with competing development 
interests and recipient states. Indeed further research could allow for a broader quantitative 
study to consider the degree of influence of each interest on state decision making on a 
broader range of cases, covering a wider geographical area. 
 Implications for the norm of sovereignty were the key focus of this paper, and the 
results show the norm in flux, indicating that it is subject to change, partly with the eventual 
outcome of the current crisis in Syria that has seen states in a deadlock over the status of the 
norm for over a year so far. The broader implications of the Euro crisis may also determine 
the balance of power in the system, and subsequent world-views on the application of the 
norm and its counterpart, governance. Future research should consider whether and how the 
norm has changed following these major events. A legal analysis on implications of an 
‘indirect breech’ of sovereignty in light of the debate over the right to development would 
shed light on the extent to which such norms have been enforced.  
7.2.2.	  Policy	  Implications	  and	  Suggestions	  
As the cornerstone of International Relations, facilitating interaction between states under 
Anarchy, understandings of Sovereignty determine the possibilities of state interaction and 
collective bargaining in all forms of foreign policy. A better understanding of the 
interpretation of sovereignty by foreign actors may be empowering for African states, 
particularly in the event that states claiming to uphold sovereignty and counter Western 
dominance indirectly exploit other states. Understandings of the varying facets of sovereignty 
may indeed create conditions under which the norm may be strengthened, through greater 
equality of nations with the attainment of development goals and the avoidance of indirect 
interference. 
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